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This article approaches the concept of sustainable development with a mind to 
the sustainability of the neoliberal economic philosophy through which official 
development is currently allocated. This article examines a contemporary aid-
dependent state in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia, to question how governance 
strategies impact the efficacy of official development assistance. Much 
contemporary development literature neglects politics, concluding that aid 
effectiveness is contingent on economic variables. An increasing number of 
econometric studies consider the impact of aid on institutions, yet few discuss the 
political and developmental objectives, ultimately illustrating the naïveté of the 
neoliberal good-governance framework and the importance of recognizing how 
interests, ideas, and ideologies combine to create the specificities of politics in 
Africa. I argue that aspects of politics in Africa such as neopatrimonialism and 
patronage must be recognized as ends to governance strategies and that these may 
sometimes take precedence; however, whether these factors impede development 
depends on the regime’s objectives. Although it accompanied its development 
efforts with human-rights abuses to secure the regime’s future, the Meles Zenawi 
regime nonetheless made great strides toward economic prosperity. 
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The personalist and kleptocratic Zairean state designed by Mobutu Sese Seko 
was maintained using aid gained from playing the Cold War superpowers against 
each other and threatening chaos in his absence (Naniuzeyi, 1999; Young & Turner, 
1985; Kabwit, 1979).  Though extreme, Zaire exemplifies well how politics may 
impact aid’s facilitation of development.  The objective of this dissertation is to 
examine contemporary aid-dependent states in sub-Saharan Africa to consider how 
governance strategies impact the efficacy of official development assistance.  
Much contemporary development literature neglects politics, concluding that aid 
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effectiveness is contingent on economic variables (see McGillivray et al., 2006 for an 
overview).  An increasing number of studies consider the impact of aid on 
institutions (e.g., Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Dutta, Leeson, 
& Williamson, 2011), yet few discuss the political strategies that establish these 
institutions.  Boone (1995) insinuated the relevance of this idea, concluding that 
regardless of the regime type, aid increases government consumption.  Concern 
regarding the relationship between aid and rent-seeking led Svensson (1996) to 
encourage focus on the political processes shaping policy and aid use.  But a regime’s 
political strategies can only be meaningfully understood after correcting 
misconceptions about how politics work, a secondary objective. 
Econometric studies drawing mathematical correlations between variables 
say little about how official development assistance is used, and their conclusions are 
complicated by aid’s often-contested, conflicting, and geopolitical objectives. 
 Therefore, this article aims alternatively to assess aid’s impact using individual cases 
to discern how aid fits into political and developmental objectives.  I argue that 
aspects of politics in Africa such as neopatrimonialism and patronage must be 
recognized as ends to governance strategies and that these aspects may sometimes 
take precedence; however, whether these factors impede development depends on 
the regime’s objectives.  Section two reviews literature on official development 
assistance and politics in Africa.  Section three applies these ideas to Ethiopia, an aid-
dependent country and an “aid darling.” It shows how a regime trying to increase its 
food security may rationalize denying portions of the population human rights in 
order to maintain power.  The final section includes comments regarding the 
applicability of the conclusions to other states.  
 
2. Literature Review and Critiques 
 
This section will first sketch the debates within the relevant literature around 
the efficacy and impact of aid.  Second, it outlines characteristics of politics in Africa. 
 While I will attempt to use phenomena particular to African politics to explain how 
aid is used, my undertaking in no way suggests that the 48 diverse countries of the 
sub-Saharan region are politically homogenous.  Despite the non-econometric 
approach adapted in the analysis, the tradition of analyzing aid econometrically 
ensures that many referenced studies were conducted this way.  The themes explored 
include the historical purpose of aid, the aid-effectiveness debate, the effect of aid on 
the receiving political environment, and politics in Africa.  
I begin with a foundation of definitions.  Following the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), I define official development assistance (ODA, henceforth 
used interchangeably with aid) as a type of foreign aid composed of flows to 
countries and territories on the DAC’s List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
development banks and institutions.  This assistance must be provided by official 
agencies or their executive counterparts, must be administered with the promotion 
of economic development and welfare as the primary objective, and must contain a 
grant element of at least 25% (OECD, 2008).  Except where noted, aid statistics used 
stem from OECD reports and their Query Wizard for International Development 
Statistics, the most recent available being from 2010.  I adopt Bräutigam and Knack’s 
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definition of aid dependence:  a situation in which government is unable to perform 
core governance functions without foreign aid and expertise, measured via aid 
allocation as a percentage of GDP (usually exceeding 10%).  Clemens, Radelet, and 
Bhavnani (2004) contend that allocations in excess of 17% of GDP will saturate the 
economy, arguing that the 8% saturation point most studies identify is favorable for 
short-impact aid.  Aid is currently being allocated in an era defined by a neoliberal 
philosophy derived from neoclassical economics.  After considering the negative 
impact of rent-seeking and corruption (Krueger, 1974; North, 1981; Olson, 1997), 
the Washington Consensus initially suggested that predatory weak states should be 
checked with economic liberalization to minimize rent creation and corruption (see 
Naim, 1999).  After the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs failed, 
however, the Post-Washington Consensus shifted away from declaring government 
failure to emphasizing correcting market failure using institutions (see Khan, 2007; 
World Bank, 1997). 
Any study considering the impact of foreign aid must first understand the 
goals of the aid.  Structural economists like Nurkse, Prebisch, Singer, Lewis, and 
Rostow (1971) (Hunt, 1989; Easterly, 2006b), emphasized that industrialization and 
development accentuate shortages in foreign exchange and balance of payments 
disequilibria but do so at the expense of import capacity. Accordingly, they 
advocated a “big push” of aid. Contemporary econometric debates about whether 
aid works (e.g., Sachs, 2005; Easterly, 2006a) tend to neglect these impediments 
(Gerschenkron, 1962), a tendency that Fischer (2009) argues renders them irrelevant. 
Others elaborated on this foundation, claiming that aid could fill a finance, savings, 
or foreign-exchange gap (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946 and 1947; Rostow, 1971; 
Chenery, 1961; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mikesell, 1968; Riddell, 1947, Chapter 8). 
 Until the late 1990s, when the theory was largely discredited, whether aid worked or 
failed revolved around a development-oriented adaptation of the Harrod-Domar 
model determining the growth and investment rates to maintain full employment 
(Thirlwall, 2002, Chapter 1; see Solow, 2000 for an adaptation and Lucas, 1990 for its 
critique).  McGillivray et al. (2006) classifies early studies beginning in the 1950s and 
ending with Boone (1995) as using poor econometric methodology and weak theory. 
Only in recent decades has politics been introduced into the aid-effectiveness 
debate, generally to call attention to the politics behind aid allocation by donors 
rather than recipients (e.g., White, 1974; Collier & Dollar, 1999; Alesina & Dollar, 
2000; Action Aid, 2005 and 2006; Grant & Nijman, 1998).  The only two scholars to 
assert the latter have been economic-freedom advocates Milton Friedman and Peter 
Bauer (1981).  Following in their footsteps, Boone (1995) argues that, regardless of 
whether the government was laissez-faire, elitist, or egalitarian, aid given via political 
motivations fails to promote investment, growth, or improvement in the economic 
conditions of the poor and instead increases government consumption (i.e., spending 
that does not contribute to an increase in national productivity).  Despite scrutiny 
(summarized by Hansen & Tarp, 2000a), his conclusion that allocations 
unequivocally increase government consumption has been upheld by both 
supporters (e.g., Burnside & Dollar, 2000 and 2004; Clemens, Radelet, & Bhavnani, 
2004) and opponents of aid. 
Boone’s assertions led subsequent researchers to discern additional variables 
upon which the effectiveness of aid allocations could be conditional.  One of the 
first attempts was a monumental World Bank (1998) study, which concluded that aid 
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is associated with higher growth if the receiving regime’s policy environment proves 
appropriate (see also Cassen & Associates, 1994); this upheld the Post-Washington 
Consensus’ “good governance” agenda, derived from new institutional economics, 
which considers an appropriate policy environment one in which the state’s role is to 
establish frameworks such as rule of law, property rights, and contract enforceability 
that strengthen the market’s ability to encourage development (World Bank, 1997). 
 Other researchers remained within this paradigm (e.g., Dollar & Easterly, 1999), 
suggesting aid’s effectiveness is conditional upon low inflation, a balanced budget, 
trade openness (Burnside & Dollar, 2000), an index of economic freedom (Ovaska, 
2003) or institutional quality (Burnside & Dollar, 2004).  However, Easterly, Levine, 
and Roodman (2004) discredit the econometric analysis of Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) from which many others derived their work, and cast a significant level of 
doubt, as results seem to be highly sensitive to indicator choice (Clemens, Radelet, & 
Bhavnani, 2004; see also Rajan & Subramanian, 2005; Hansen & Tarp, 2000a; 
Brumm, 2003; Easterly, 2003).  Neoliberal discourse implies that by making aid 
allocations conditional on economic liberalization and democratization, aid is a 
means to better governance.  Democratization and decentralization are thus valued 
for their ability to introduce political competition promoting accountability. 
In spite of debates spanning nearly half a century around the effectiveness of 
aid (see Hansen & Tarp, 2000b for a summary), few studies consider aid’s effect on 
the receiving political environment.  Those that do tend to fit into the neoliberal 
paradigm or take a stance against it by suggesting that aid may degrade institutions 
and environments (e.g., Goldsmith, 2001, implying that aid encourages 
democratization by encouraging political and economic freedom, with Knack, 2004, 
refuting).  Studies like Knack’s (2001) and Bräutigam and Knack’s (2004) discuss a 
tendency for aid to weaken government accountability in institutions crucial to 
development (called an “aid-institutions paradox” by Moss, Pettersson, & van de 
Walle, 2006) by encouraging corruption (Ovaska, 2003) and rent-seeking (Tornell & 
Lane, 1999; Svensson, 1996) in aid-dependent countries (Moss & Subramanian, 
2005).  Oya and Pons-Vignon (2010) contend that aid decreases policy space and 
disincentivizes mobilizing domestic resources while creating a logic of aid 
maximization; in doing so, the aid prioritizes appeasing donors instead of developing 
policies geared toward long-term development.  
Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson (2011) consider both camps in the literature 
(i.e., that aid degrades policy environments, or that according to the good 
governance agenda, aid may make governments more democratic) to argue that aid 
has an “amplification effect” that enhances the tendencies already present.  Two 
years earlier, Wright (2009) provided a more detailed causal explanation for similar 
observations:  as the authoritarian leader’s coalition increases in size, aid first 
increases the probability of democratization, and second, as economic growth 
decreases, aid decreases the likelihood of democratization.  Similarly, Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2008) contend that the effect of aid on democratization 
prospects depends on the institutional context and on whether a revolutionary threat 
is imminent.  While aid seems to provide a social incentive to increase citizen 
welfare, unless the rulers face a revolutionary threat and their political coalition is 
large, aid actually provides the opposite political incentive and encourages 
autocratization.  Kono and Montinola (2009) aim to draw out nuances in a 
connected inquiry concerned with whether or not aid advances political survival; they 
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conclude affirmatively but note that the degree to which regimes can stockpile aid 
and use it politically varies by regime type, with autocratic leaders being more able 
than their democratic counterparts to develop “slack resources.”  
To consider the political calculations that leaders make in employing aid, it is 
necessary to explore the nature of politics in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa). 
 But a few additional definitions are in order.  First, for Alence (2004), the term 
neopatrimonial is a characterization of a system in which the states possess formal 
modern bureaucracies yet utilize informal patrimonial principles like personalist 
political authority, weak checks and balances, and clientelism.  Such structure is 
characterized and reproduced by insecurity.  Second, like Erdmann and Engel (2007), 
I define clientelism as an exchange or brokerage of services and resources for political 
support, often via votes.  Finally, patronage is the politically motivated distribution of 
favors to groups, primarily ethnically.  While the former is a type of highly 
asymmetrical personal relations, the latter serves more as an instrument for 
maintaining political cohesion (pp. 106-108). 
The idea that African governments will use certain policy instruments as part 
of their governance strategy is neither new nor specific to aid.  Rulers have 
historically institutionalized their regimes by using parastatals and import licenses 
from quotas and agricultural marketing boards to intervene in markets and allow 
resources to flow to important constituencies (Herbst, 1990).  Sandbrook (1985) 
maintains that the political instability, systemic corruption, and maladministration 
that stem from neopatrimonialism and personal rule impede economic activity. 
 Bates (1981) attributes such decisions to the prioritization of political stability over 
economic growth with the belief that the economic irrationality is compensated for, 
something van de Walle’s (2001) analysis of regime manipulation of structural 
adjustment programs echoes (see also Williams, 1994).  For Chabal and Daloz 
(1999), politics in Africa “works” because patron-client relations pervading states’ 
poorly institutionalized neopatrimonial systems allow actors to maximize returns 
despite uncertainty.  Such personalist logic may cause politically insignificant citizens 
to be strategically neglected, a strategy that can result in the state losing legitimacy 
and acting oppressively to maintain control (Erdmann & Engel, 2007, pp. 13-15; 
Agbese, 2007, p. 41). 
I briefly leverage four critiques whose implications will be illustrated through 
the case study of Ethiopia. First, I draw attention to the naïveté of neoliberal good 
governance.  Despite the fact that neoliberalism was developed with the aim of 
breaking the corrupt and clientelistic connections pervading African states and 
stopping government failure, focusing on the institutions that shape the market 
(World Bank, 1997) neglects how rationally calculated governance strategies affect 
the shape of institutions and may even choose to disregard development in favor of 
political stability. Indeed, the market itself is a politically constructed and enabled 
institution (Craig & Porter, 2006).  Considering these strategies yields an 
understanding of former Prime Minister Meles’ desire to refuse food aid to 
communities affiliated with political opponents. 
Second, I aim to understand the interests, ideas, and ideologies of politics 
and accept that, while different from the West, they are legitimate in their own right. 
 Neoliberal economic philosophy (or rather, the organizations and donors 
developing it) should aim not to alter politics in Africa (Craig and Porter, 2006) but 
to work with them. Admitting that politics in Africa are unfavorable and 
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neopatrimonial (see van de Walle, 2001 for an example of this tendency and Pitcher, 
Moran, & Johnston, 2007 for a critique) does not advance one’s understanding about 
how and why the phenomena that come hand in hand with neopatrimonialism, such 
as clientelism and corruption, occur and are rationalized.  Rather than searching for 
“alternatives to corrupt and incompetent central governments in low-income states” 
(van de Walle, 2005, p. 63), or suggesting that states would become stronger by 
weakening the informal institutions around them (Migdal, 1988), I aim to understand 
why these traditions continue and how development may be realized within the 
confines of the political paradigm.  Kelsall (2011) suggests that if economic rents can 
be centralized and focused over a long-term horizon (Olson, 1997) and pro-market, 
pro-rural policies are implemented, neopatrimonialism may indeed be harnessed for 
development.  
This leads me to my third point.  How do we know whether aid works in 
good policy environments as the current discourse anticipates (e.g., Burnside & 
Dollar 2000 and 2004 and Collier & Dollar, 1999) if no attempt is made to assess the 
politics that shape and sometimes even impede the nature of the system and the 
institutions that fuel growth?  Failure to acknowledge the ways in which politics may 
impede development not only leads to inaccurate predictions about the impact of aid 
but also fails to understand the pervasiveness of, let alone resolve, corruption.  
Fourth, and finally, it is necessary to question the shared optimism held by 
donors, academics (Burnside & Dollar, 1997; Dutta, Leeson, & Williamson, 2011) 
and international financial institutions (World Bank, 1997, Chapters 5-7), about aid 
and democratization. This optimism results from a failure to acknowledge that 
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa does not resemble Western liberal democracy 
(Diamond, 1999).  Rose and Shin (2001) fear that the consolidation of liberal 
democracy has not been realized because the democratizing states are not modern 
Weberian states that have formal institutions establishing an efficient, autonomous 
bureaucracy and a monopoly of force (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).  In fact, Forrest 
(1988) articulated ways in which African states appear “soft”:  no structural 
autonomy, (e.g., clientelist connections shaping socioeconomic policy and generating 
regime support), local structures that are not integrated into the central 
administration, and limited capacity to extract resources or to ideologically persuade 
the populous states to act in their best interest.  
There remains a question as to whether Western democracy can be sustained 
given the socioeconomic conditions, corruption, clientelism, and widespread poverty, 
but also whether its continuation would lead to higher standards of living (Owusu, 
1992; Sandbrook, 1996).  Therefore, fundamentally, failure to comprehend why 
certain state structures and political institutions are overdeveloped (i.e., patronage) in 
comparison to others (i.e., balance of power) stems from an inability to recognize the 
historical origin of how this trajectory originated and what fuels its continuation 
(Koelble & LiPuma, 2008, p. 11). 
I apply the critiques and understandings of politics in Africa to Ethiopia in 
the next section.  The concern is not only whether aid discourages policy reform by 
substituting private capital and insulating governments from political change, but 
also to what extent policy reform is relevant, given that Ethiopia ranked fifth in a list 
of the world’s ten fastest-growing economies of the last decade (van de Walle, 2001, 
pp. 21, 50 and 52-53; The Economist, 2011).  I hope that the clarifications and 
critiques leveraged in this section can provide understanding in how official 
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development assistance is used as a means to an end, whether that end is 
development, a political strategy, or a combination. 
 
3. Case Study and Implications: Ethiopia 
 
This section aims to understand the motivations and priorities of Ethiopia 
using scholarly and news articles, and analyses by international organizations and 
embassies. I first give a selective political-historical overview, followed by an analysis 
of how aid has advanced governance strategies.  The section will show that while 
neopatrimonialism and patronage may impede development, whether they do 
depends on the governance strategy of the regime. In the case of Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi’s regime, while human rights abuses were often conducted to ensure 
regime security, strides were nonetheless made toward development objectives.  
A few numbers help set the scene. Official development assistance has 
increased significantly, with the average between 2000 and 2010 reaching $2.395 
billion. In 2010, Ethiopia was largest aid recipient in Africa and the second largest in 
the world (OECD, 2012b).  In 2011, its largest bilateral donor, the United States, 
provided $847 million in aid, over a third of which was in food aid.  In 2010, 34% of 
the aid went to social sectors, 17% was programmatic, and 16% was humanitarian 
(U.S. Department of State, 2012a; OECD, 2012a; OECD, 2012c; Furtado and Smith, 
2007).  Moss and Subramanian found in 2005 that 23% of Ethiopia’s GDP was 
derived from aid, marking it as an aid-dependent country. 
Although Ethiopia defeated colonial power Italy in 1896, it was briefly re-
occupied in 1935-1936 (Novati, 2008).  Pressured by economic crisis, drought, 
famine, corruption, and the Eritrean nationalist movement, Emperor Haile Selassie’s 
regime yielded to revolutionary protests in 1974.  The provisional administrative 
council of soldiers (i.e., the Derg) that deposed him installed an infiltratory Marxist 
government.  Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime fared no better at alleviating drought, 
and impoverishing socialist economic policies coupled with famine encouraged 
through war against self-determinism caused millions to starve in the “Biblical” 
famine of the 1980s (BBC, 2012; de Waal, 1997; Keller, 1992).  In spite of the 1987 
adoption of a new constitution that devolved power and established autonomous 
regional governments, most nationalist movements coordinated military strategies as 
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (Keller, 1995; 
Donham, 1992; de Waal, 1997).  
After the EPRDF took political control in 1991, elections in 1995 established 
a multiparty democracy.  Yet it is a pseudo-democracy (or for Hagmann & Abbink 
2011, a revolutionary democracy) that has increasingly reverted toward 
authoritarianism since the 2005 elections (U.S. Department of State, 2012a; Human 
Rights Watch, 2010; Clapham, 2004).  Because the regime largely determines the 
country’s development direction (and stability is seen as a prerequisite for 
development), critics are labeled “anti-development” or “anti-peace.”  In spite of the 
constitution’s ethnic federalism, a centralized policy and decision-making structure is 
paradoxically maintained.  
In an extreme bid for political control, the 2009 Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation No. 652 uses the buzzword “terrorism” to gain favor as an ally in the 
war on terror and crack down on free speech and protests with minimal donor 
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complaints.  In June 2011, parliament employed it to designate five groups as 
terrorist organizations: two separatist ethnic political organizations, one opposition 
political party, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab (U.S. Department of State, 2012a; Salisbury, 
2011).  Thus, not unlike Mengistu in the 1980s, in summer 2007 and fall 2011, 
amidst continuing drought and famine across the Horn of Africa, then-Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi employed aid as a tool of repression, denying food, seed, and 
fertilizer to the Ogaden region while insisting its blockades merely prevented guns 
and material from reaching the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 
(Gettleman, 2007a; Gettleman, 2007b; Waterfield, 2011; Garrison, 2011; BBC 
Newsnight, 2011; Keen, 1994). 
In 1995, after Sudanese-backed Egyptian terrorists attempted to assassinate 
then-President Hosni Mubarak, whose regime had aided the TPLF in ousting 
Mengistu, Meles endeared himself to the West by supporting the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (Verhoeven, 2012b).  His positions on 
Somalia later made him the United States’ junior sheriff in the Horn of Africa (The 
Economist, 2008).  Despite his disrespect of human rights and political and civil 
liberties, Meles earned a reputation for being technocratically focused on pro-poor 
sustainable development (Dowden, 2012a; Furtado & Smith, 2007). Although an aid 
darling, Meles defied neoliberal prescriptions, making centralized economic decisions 
and leaving land government-owned and businesses affiliated with the ruling party, a 
tendency furthered by a pervasive patronage system (Furtado and Smith, 2007).  For 
these reasons, the regime was developmentally patrimonial, or focused on achieving 
long term economic development for itself and others in spite of its political 
intolerance (Vaughan & Gebremichael, 2011).  The country has maintained an 
average growth rate between 8% and 11% since 2000, primarily the result of foreign 
investment in the country’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors (African 
Economic Outlook, 2012a).  
Given the tendency of food aid to be used politically and geopolitically 
(Thurow and Kilman, 2009; Keen, 1994), I examine the agricultural sector.  Ethiopia 
remains a low-income food-deficit country (Rosen, 2012).  Food insecurity is a 
product of the population’s low purchasing power and poor infrastructure. There is 
also a direct correlation with the amount of food imported (and food aid received) 
and the volatility in the price of exports, more than 75% of which are agricultural 
(Adenew, 2004).  While economic liberalization was necessary to escape the damage 
of import substitution industrialization from the Derg era (Vaughan and 
Gebremichael, 2011), the regime’s prudence is appropriate; too closely following 
neoliberal prescriptions may defeat efforts to improve food security (Oya, 2005; 
Adenew, 2004; Porter, 2012).  
I now draw broader implications about the situation reviewed.  The case 
study shows how a regime aiming to increase its food security denies portions of the 
population a human right in order to maintain power.  In doing so, this study 
ultimately disagrees with Whitfield and Fraser (2008), who argue that only weak 
negotiating countries use foreign aid to stabilize their political regime.  In spite of its 
current account deficit, Ethiopia has more control over aid negotiations than nearly 
all of sub-Saharan Africa because its state and planning institutions are strong and 
well established (Furtado & Smith, 2007).  
However, questions have been raised about the future of Ethiopia given the 
death of Meles Zenawi on August 21, 2012.  Meles was a shrewd political negotiator 
Consilience Meyer: Aiding Development or Aiding Politics? 
who influenced American strategies on Sudan and Somalia, sat on Blair’s 
Commission for Africa, represented the African Union in climate-change 
negotiations, and peacefully managed South Sudan’s succession (Verhoeven, 2012a 
and 2012b).  Although the EPRDF elite stresses that Meles’ deputy and successor, 
foreign minister Hailemariam Desalegn, will maintain his vision, concerns about the 
future of EPRDF’s coalition have made his premiership largely a figurehead role to 
avoid shifts in power for the state and military (Woldemariam, 2012a; Blunt, 2012; 
Abdi, 2012).  Perhaps he will manage to hold together Meles’ pan-Africanist visions, 
but grievances connected to ethnic and income inequality could emerge as a result of 
Meles’ economic modernization policies and political intolerance.  Furthermore, 
much of the unlikely partnership between a regime with Marxist roots and Western 
donors stem from Meles’ charisma and negotiating skill.  However, the U.S. has thus 
far supported him, hoping that his non-Amharic or -Tigrayan roots will allow him to 
foster broader political support (Woldemariam, 2012b). 
The study yields a number of conclusions.  First, the case illustrates the 
benefit of individualized analysis to examine each country’s politico-economic 
utilization of aid.  It is difficult to conclude that aid is facilitating a “big push” (Sachs 
et al., 2004) since the objective of the bulk of aid received (particularly with 
Ethiopia’s large percentage of food aid) is not meant to impact economic growth, or, 
in the case of most social expenditures, cannot do so in the short term (OECD, 
2012a). 
Second, neoliberal standards regarding economic governance ignore the 
political considerations that influence the regime’s effort to maintain power (Meyer, 
2012a).  When overlooked, decisions to withhold food from communities defy 
conditionalities, (or, as other neighboring countries have done, fund a rebel 
movement, maintain violence in part of the country, or pay voters to maintain the 
status quo) may appear illogical (Cammick, 2007).  Ultimately, this underscores the 
importance of understanding the interests, ideas, and ideologies of politics in Africa, 
as applying a political lens allows us to recognize why outcomes include corruption, 
patronage, clientelism, and political violence.  
Third, neopatrimonial systems need not be juxtaposed with development 
objectives, or impede economic activity as Sandbrook (1985) alleged.  The case 
study, an example of developmental patrimonialism (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 
2012), shows that contrary to the good governance agenda’s assumptions, corruption 
and patronage need not derail economic growth.  This upholds a conclusion noted 
by Allen (1995), Sandbrook (1985), Kelsall (2011), and Jackson and Rosberg (1982): 
 the personalized nature of governance makes some strategies more developmentally 
effective, stable, or skilled than others. 
Fourth, the Ethiopia case study illustrates the difficulty of realizing neoliberal 
expectations that aid might encourage democratization.  This seems to uphold Moss, 
Pettersson, and van de Walle’s (2006) conclusion that substantial aid revenues may 
make regimes less accountable; however, the differing nature of democracy in Africa 
and the use of patronage and clientelism to connect with politically relevant citizens 
make identifying causality difficult (see Sandbrook, 1996; Owusu, 1992, Koelble & 
LiPuma, 2008).  Ironically, in some circumstances, there is donor complacency about 
politics and aid misuse (Alesina & Weder, 2002), perhaps out of a willingness to pick 
battles, even when the compromise means ignoring the governance strategies that 






This article argues that whether aspects of politics in Africa such as 
neopatrimonialism or patronage impede development depends on a regime’s 
governance strategy.  While the case study of Ethiopia is unique because of the 
amount of food aid it chronically receives and the level of donor significance it has as 
an ally in the war on terror, the conclusion about whether politics impairs 
development objectives may be applied to other sub-Saharan states by examining 
how aid fits into their governance strategies. 
Rwanda has used aid to promote regional and internal stability by backing the 
Tutsi M23 rebellion in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (Reyntjens, 
2010 and 2004; Hayman, 2007; Meyer, 2012b), while Uganda’s Museveni has used 
aid to prolong the conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army and corruption in the 
military meant to fight them to maintain his hold on power (Doom and Vlassenroot, 
1999; Prunier, 2004; van Acker, 2004; Tangri and Mwenda, 2006). Despite the high 
level of aid dependence that the Zambian economy has shown since Kaunda, the 
summer of 2010 yielded the suspension of health aid by the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, while the European Union suspended 
infrastructure aid—a result both of evidence of embezzlement of public funds and 
of graft by subsequent regimes (Rakner, 2003; Mfula, 2010; Fraser, 2007; IOL News, 
2010).  In Malawi, the United Kingdom suspended general budget support in 2011 as 
a result of concerns over mismanagement and human rights violations; but the 
change in leadership following President Mutharika's death in April has altered the 
political strategy, and thus, improved relations between the countries and respect for 
economic conditionalities (BBC News, 2012; Farrell, 2012).  The 2008 inaugurated 
coalition government in Zimbabwe has also behaved differently, and its increased 
efforts to improve freedom and prosperity have led the European Union to ease 
some aid restrictions (Croft, 2012). 
This does not, however, mean that these regimes (whose sometimes violent 
responses against perceived threats to their stability support Agbese, 2007’s 
assertions) are juxtaposing security with development.  Their actions resemble 
Samudavanija’s (1991) conception of a three-dimensional state, which retains 
legitimacy by tackling three objectives:  security, development, and participation, with 
the first being made paramount.  One final point of clarification to allay skepticism: 
 I could not possibly suggest that all official development assistance is “misused.” 
 Skarbek and Leeson (2009) argue that aid which can solve the simple problem of a 
lack of capital for a singular, predetermined end, such as the production of vaccines, 
has the potential to be most developmentally effective because it provides a means to 
a clearly delineated end (see also Sachs, 2006).  Some aid is fungible (Pack & Pack, 
1993; Devarajan & Swaroop, 1998), and some may be co-opted into governance 
objectives, but these need not be derailed.  My aim is to call attention to differences 
in regional politics and how recognition and acceptance of such differences may yield 
better understanding of the reasoning behind, and the varying paths toward, certain 
outcomes.  By understanding why such phenomena like corruption and patronage 
continue, we can more accurately understand Africa’s needs as it breaks from the 
hopeless, violent, and impoverished stereotypes of its past. 
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